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Abstract: With the end of the Second World War in 1945, Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
mainly from the United States went to formerly industrialized European countries to help rebuild 
their war-torn infrastructures and societies. By the 1950s, Asian countries and societies such as 
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan became major recipients of US and other international aid as 
support for institutional and economic development. At that time, development in many African 
states was the responsibilities of the colonial powers that had political and economic management 
responsibilities in the colonial territories. With decolonization starting in 1957 and accelerating in 
the 1960s in sub-Saharan Africa, and at the height of the Cold War, foreign assistance to the region 
was mainly as support to governments on the basis of their ideological proclivities rather than for 
institution building and economic development.  With the end of the Cold War, the use of foreign 
assistance as a tool of foreign policy has not changed, but countries like Japan, China and South 
Korea have joined the club of donor nations in the international system. The question becomes: to 
what extent are these new donors likely to change the game of foreign assistance to achieve better 
economic development results than Western aid donors in Africa? This paper examines the 
hypothesis that to the extent that Western and Asian donors continue the practice of policy transfers 
that use funding decisions and implementations based on Western and Asian experiences devoid of 
policy lessons from domestic realities, foreign assistance will remain ineffective as a significant tool 
for economic development and growth in Africa.  The bulk of the paper will focus on a comparative 
analysis of foreign assistance and policy outcomes in Nigeria and Zambia.  
 
 
Introduction  
After the end of the Second World War in 1945, the United States, through what came to be called 
the Marshall Plan, provided significant amounts of financial and in-kind aid for the rehabilitation of 
war-torn economies in Western Europe. By the mid-1950s, as Western Europe and the United States 
faced the threat of the spread of socialism from the Soviet Union and its satellite states in Eastern 
Europe, the United States turned its attention to aiding the reconstruction effort in post-war Japan, 
South Korea and Taiwan. These countries were considered frontline states for the fight against the 
spread of communism and the United States believed that strengthening their economies and helping 
them develop robust civil societies would make communist infiltration of these societies very 
difficult. Hence, U.S. policymakers considered development aid to this part of the world an 
important and effective way to fight what was considered the menace of socialism.   
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Meanwhile, in the African colonies, economic and political development remained entirely in 
the hands of the European powers that had control of these territories. Nevertheless, the European 
colonizers were not able to effectively control the pace of decolonization as many African freedom 
fighters, some of whom had either participated in or were aware of the struggle for freedom in 
Europe during World War II, were launching bloody battles against continued European domination 
in the continent. Thus, by the mid-1950s, the decolonization project in the African colonies was 
going quite strong, albeit with significant and bloody opposition from the Europeans in some 
colonies such as French Algeria, Belgian Congo, French Cameroons, and the Portuguese colonies of 
Angola and Mozambique.  
By the early 1960s, several African colonies had gained independence and the new countries 
were now facing a world split politically and economically into East (led by the Soviet Union) and 
West (led by the United States). This was the height of what came to be known as the ―Cold War‖ 
and foreign aid to the new African countries, from both the East and West, was designed primarily to 
entice these countries to support either of the globally feuding parties (i.e., socialist East and 
capitalist West) in the international arena. Thus, foreign assistance to the African countries was 
mainly a tool in support of governments on the basis of the ideological proclivities of their leaders 
rather than for targeted institutional and economic development in the newly independent states. This 
approach to the allocation of development assistance forced many African leaders to engage in 
opportunistic, and to a certain extent, hypocritical behavior, in order to secure development 
assistance, including food aid from the West or East. The outcome was that development assistance 
was not granted based on domestic needs, as well as the efficiency with which the aid could improve 
the welfare of African societies, but on the willingness of national leaders to support either Soviet or 
American ideals at various global forums. For example, African countries that did not support U.S. 
objectives at the United Nations, and hence voted against them, were not likely to be granted U.S. 
aid even if such assistance was likely to have significant positive impact on the welfare of the poor 
country‘s citizens. For example, during the time the United States actively supported the apartheid 
government in South Africa, supposedly because of the regime‘s anti-communist posture, the 
frontline states, notably Zambia, suffered significantly, not only from South African attacks but also 
from U.S. neglect and denial of development assistance.  
It is estimated that since 1945, the United States has provided the African countries with as 
much as $1,000 billion in development assistance. Unfortunately, there is little by way of actual 
development or actual positive economic and political transformation to show for this significant 
amount of money (see The Banker 2004) Why? This is because most of the Cold War period was 
largely characterized by foreign aid to authoritarian leaders in Africa without transparency in 
governance and financial accountability. In fact, a significant portion of this development assistance 
was granted to corrupt, opportunistic and authoritarian leaders in such countries as Egypt, Zaire (now 
Democratic Republic of Congo), Liberia, and Kenya, all countries that were critical in the U.S. effort 
to fight Soviet expansionism. While it is true that all these countries were and are still poor, and 
hence, needed the resources for economic development, the award of these funds was not based on 
the presentation, by these leaders of effective plans for domestic economic transformation. Most of 
these leaders, after all, were dictators who used the additional resources obtained through foreign aid 
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to prop-up their regimes and not for economic development. Hence, most foreign aid was used to 
purchase regime security by, for example, co-opting competing elites and paying off others, 
especially those (e.g., military elites) who were capable of overthrowing the government. 
The end of the Cold War and the subsequent disintegration of the Soviet Union brought about 
an era of accountability and transparency in Africa—first, was the demise of the apartheid regime in 
South Africa, and second, was the collapse of several authoritarian governments in the continent, and 
third, was the ushering in of many democratic governments throughout the continent. Suddenly, it 
appeared that genuine economic and political transformation, which many Africans believed would 
be the outcome of decolonization and independence would finally come to fruition. In addition to the 
political transformation that was taking place in the continent following the South Africa true 
independence, many African countries were also transforming their economies as they engaged in 
structural adjustment programs (SAPs) at the urging of the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank. For most Africans, the end of the Cold War was expected to usher in a new era of 
policy autonomy as well as political and economic liberalization.  The new era was expected to be 
characterized by direct citizen participation in the design and implementation of policies affecting 
their lives. In other words, the top-down, elite-driven approach to public policy, which had been 
adopted at independence, was now supposed to give way to a more participatory, inclusive, bottom-
up, and people-driven approach to public policy. Under the latter, all of each country‘s relevant 
stakeholders would be able to participate fully and effectively in the design and implementation of 
policies affecting their lives. Under this new approach, the African countries would still participate 
in global affairs—export and import goods and services, receive foreign aid, including food and 
military aid, and engage in other international transactions—but, the maximization of African values 
and objectives would now be the driving force behind any decisions taken by the African countries at 
both the domestic and international levels. Of particular interest here, is the fact that many groups in 
Africa believe that foreign aid in the post-Cold War era must be granted without any preconditions 
on the part of the donors and that the aid‘s disbursement and allocation must be undertaken in a 
transparent and accountable manner in order to ensure that it achieves the main objective of 
providing the wherewithal for self-actualization for the poor. 
Unfortunately, most of the West has resisted this new approach to development aid and 
continues to use economic and development assistance as a foreign policy tool. While aid is no 
longer used as a tool to garner partners for the fight against communism, many developed countries, 
especially the developed industrial countries of the North, are using aid to gain access to Africa‘s 
emerging markets—they want to secure markets from which they can extract important and critical 
raw materials for their domestic industries and to which they can sell their excess output. These 
―new‖ objectives of foreign aid are exactly like those of colonialism and hence, the relationship 
between the African economies and the European countries is basically returning to what it was 
during colonialism. 
But, the question is what about Japan and the emerging economic superpowers of South 
Korea and China?  What types of foreign aid regimes do these countries, which themselves have, at 
one time or another, been recipients of foreign aid, have? These countries, which are now major 
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international aid donors, have declared their intent to follow a different path to the disbursement of 
their aid resources to Africa. The question then becomes, to what extent will the foreign policy 
objectives of these countries inform their foreign aid decisions? As Peter Hall (91-92) argues:      
 
In technically complex fields of policy, such as macroeconomic policy-making, decision-
makers are often guided by an overarching set of ideas that specify how the problems facing 
them are to be perceived, which goals might be attained through policy and what sorts of 
techniques can be used to reach those goals.  Ideas about each of these matters interlock to 
form a relatively coherent whole that might be described as a policy paradigm.  Like a 
gestalt, it structures the very way in which policy-makers see the world and their role in it 
(Hall 1995). 
Indeed, ideas are the basis for setting policy agendas, debates, formulation and implementation. In 
that respect, what the decision-makers perceive as attainable are often reflected in their worldviews. 
It is often the willingness to look again at the familiar sets of ideas and institutions whose outcomes 
have been less than expected that result in policy change for transformative outcomes. Thus, to the 
extent that Western and Asian donors continue the practice of policy transfer, defined as ―a form of 
decision making by analogy, using another entity‘s experience as a source of ideas and evidence,‖ 
(Mossberger and Wolman 2003), for policy in another setting where most of the funding decisions 
and implementations are based on Western and Asian experiences devoid of policy lessons from 
domestic realities, actors and institutions in sub-Saharan African states, foreign assistance whether 
new or old will remain ineffective as a tool for significant economic development and growth in 
Africa (see Hulme 2005) . Basically, if the new Asian donors—South Korea, China and Japan—
adopt approaches to development assistance that are similar to those utilized by the United States and 
Western Europe—that is, allowing donor foreign policy objectives to determine the scope and nature 
of aid—the latter will fail to have positive impact on economic and political transformation in 
Africa. For aid to have the effect of helping improve living conditions in Africa, as well as creating 
within the African countries, environments for the development of democratic cultures, the 
advancement of aid from the developed countries to the African countries must be based on the 
development needs of each African country. 
While data and references across sub-Saharan Africa are used in the analysis in this work, we 
will pay particular attention to the extent that ODA has yielded significant economic development in 
Nigeria and Zambia. The paper begins with an introduction that delineates prevalent issues regarding 
ODA in sub-Saharan Africa. This is followed by a description of selected current economic data in 
the region with closer focus on ODA to Nigeria and Zambia; and a discussion of the nature of aid 
transfers and their relevance as a policy tool for alleviating poverty and promoting economic 
development. The paper concludes with specific suggestions on how best to deploy aid transfers as a 
tool for significant economic development in sub-Saharan Africa.  
In this paper, I advance the argument that Africans and others (e.g., donors) engaged in and/or 
interested in the economic development of Africa should think big, but implement their thoughts in 
measured incremental steps in specific sectors of the African economies with a view to achieving 
transformative and tangible outcomes.  Consequently, the emerging donors‘ (i.e., Japan, South Korea 
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and PRC) alternative approach is likely to succeed if they use their human capital and material 
resources for investment in Africa in ways that directly engage domestic political actors, and civil 
society organizations (especially those belonging to historically marginalized and deprived 
stakeholders—women, rural inhabitants, ethnic minorities, and the urban poor) within a highly 
decentralized institutional environment that targets a single issue at a time rather than attempting to 
solve all development problems in one swoop and perhaps, more importantly, assures that design and 
implementation of development programs is bottom-up, participatory, and people-driven. Such an 
approach is likely to make a positive difference in the lives of Africans because it will enable foreign 
assistance to focus on issues that are critical to the people (e.g., institution building for economic and 
political governance, capacity building for entrepreneurship, as well as conflict resolution, etc.) and 
enhance the ability of governments to focus on high public priorities. For example, a foreign project 
that focuses on helping domestic entrepreneurs seek and discover opportunities for profit 
maximization (e.g., gaining access to new markets for locally-produced products through effective 
utilization of new information technologies) can promote wealth creation and significantly increase 
the local tax base. Increased generation of wealth locally should significantly minimize the need for 
governments to depend on external debt as a way to secure resources for the provision of public 
goods and services. Helping local people finance their own governments, instead of relying on 
foreign subventions, will enhance civic responsibility and ensure that governments are accountable to 
the governed. In addition, these types of interactions between the people and their government 
should significantly improve the legitimacy of the government and the willingness of Africans to see 
their government as their own creation and not a foreign imposition. 
 
Current Economic Conditions in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 Comparatively, states in the sub-Saharan region are burdened by low per capita income, high debt 
rates, and lack of basic communication resources such as telephone lines, fax machines and 
computers that are necessary for effective participation in today‘s information-dominated global 
economy. In general, the African economies, almost without exception, lack the scientific and 
technological infrastructures that are necessary for successful and gainful participation in what is 
essentially a very competitive global economy. For example, a 1992 study found that in terms of 
scientists and engineers per million populations, Africa had 53 compared to 3,548 for Japan, 209 for 
Latin America, and 202 for Arab states (Kennedy 1993, 216). A more recent study that examines the 
relationship between innovation and absorptive capacity and economic growth found that, relative to 
other regions, Africa continues to lag behind. Based on gross domestic expenditure on research and 
development as a percentage of world expenditure on research and development, while the figure for 
developing countries is 15.6%, for the developed countries, it is 84.4%. The regional variation is 
even more insightful. For Asia, the figure is 27.9%, Latin America & the Caribbean, 3.1% and for 
sub-Saharan Africa (excluding the North African states), the figure is 0.5% (Onyeiwu 2011, 16).  
The expenditure column is reflected in the actual proportion of African researchers in science and 
technology compared to other regions.  Thus, while the number of researchers as a percentage of 
world totals for the developing countries is 28.4%, it is 71.6% for the developed countries.  And, for 
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Asia, the number is 34.5%, Latin America & the Caribbean, 6.7% and sub-Saharan Africa, the 
number is 1.0% (ibid) of world total researchers in science and technology. The consequence of the 
foregoing is that, the regional distribution of scientific and technical publications (2000 to 2005) 
reflects the low trend in advancing scientific and technical knowledge in Africa as a foundation and 
support for economic growth.  For the period, average scientific and technical publications for East 
Asia & Pacific is 29,998 with a growth rate of 119%; Latin American countries, 17,497, and a 
growth rate of 36%; Middle East & North Africa, 4,839, with a growth rate of 69%; South Asia, 
12,845 with a growth rate of 42%; and sub-Saharan Africa, 3,413, with a growth rate of 6% (ibid, 
18). What the data reveal is the absence of the use of scientific and technological knowledge as tools 
to enable a focused and strategic approach to development in sub-Saharan Africa. The data also point 
to the declining nature of research and publication of scientific and technical knowledge necessary 
for African states to engage in sustainable economic development projects. With a low knowledge 
base in science and technology, producing value-added goods that are globally competitive in both 
price and quality and which can be consumed locally, as well as exported, is quite challenging and in 
many instances, not possible. The direct consequence is poor economic growth and development 
characterized by persistent problems of high unemployment, low access to healthcare, poor 
infrastructure, and low level of citizens‘ engagement in the socio-economic environment, especially 
in education. This low attention to science and technology education is evident in the high costs of 
transportation, energy and access to information technology through the Internet—all costs that put 
constraints on new entrepreneurial activities and pressures on existing business concerns. Sub-
optimal technologies in the power sector and transportation, coupled with high costs of energy 
imports for some countries and other logistical problems associated with economic development 
result in high transaction costs of what is produced, frequently making them less competitive in the 
international market (see IMF 2010). And, with the emigration of competent African scholars and 
professionals to Europe, North America and Asia—economies that provide their citizens and 
residents with technological environments that maximize their productive efforts—the creation of 
the technologies that are relevant to problem solving in the African economies in general and wealth 
creation, and hence, poverty alleviation, in particular, is likely to suffer. This vicious cycle is 
bolstered by Africa‘s continuing reliance and dependence on the export of raw materials and partly 
explains rampant poverty in the general population, as well as structural violence and opportunistic 
behaviors on the part of civil servants and other government officials in the region (Mukum Mbaku 
2007, see chapter 4).  
Indeed, dependence on external resources such as ODA, debt, and other forms of external 
assistance (e.g., military and food aid), has created within African governance institutions a set of 
highly opportunistic individuals who use the aid industry as a scheme to extract extra-legal income 
for themselves. These are civil servants and politicians who use government structures under their 
control as instruments of plunder, and design and implement only public policies that provide them 
personal benefits and not necessarily those that enhance the national welfare. Such elites are most 
likely to steer donors into areas that may not produce positive benefits for society but which, will 
allow the state custodians to significantly enrich themselves. In fact, it is unusual for such an 
opportunistic civil servant or politician to approve a ―development‖ project that would generate 
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enormous positive benefits for both the state custodian and his or her foreign benefactor but impose 
enormous environmental and ecosystem damage in the domestic economy. Since such political 
opportunism often occurs in an environment where leaders do not actively interact with citizens, the 
latter are usually not aware of it—such leaders are usually quite susceptible to manipulation by 
foreign actors. In fact, in the 1980s, many of these African leaders were easily railroaded into 
undertaking so-called structural adjustment programs, which devastated domestic economies, impose 
severe social costs on the poor, but provided a few elites with extra-legal income. Thus, while these 
elites benefited from these programs, poverty rates increased significantly and perhaps more 
important is the fact that the intensity of poverty and the levels of material deprivation among many 
Africans rose substantially. Thus, in addition to the fact that many African economies lack the types 
of institutional arrangements that adequately constrain civil servants and prevent them from engaging 
in the various forms of opportunism, these economies do not possess the necessary economic 
infrastructures to allow them to participate effectively, fully and gainfully in the modern global 
economy. As a consequence, Africa continues to remain, as it was during the colonial period, on the 
economic periphery, serving primarily as a source of raw materials for the industries of the 
developed North and dumping ground for excess output, as well as ill-fitting ideas and technologies, 
from the Western industrial countries. 
 This tendency toward mass consumption without the requisite productive capacity is reflected 
in Benjamin Berber‘s argument that even though Africa may be falling off the world‘s economic 
chart, it is home to an over 600-million person soft-drink market featuring warm climates, youthful 
populations and governments moving toward market economies (Berber 1995). Indeed, the 
interconnectedness that contemporary global political economy portends is one in which Africa‘s 
assigned role is continued peripheral status in the global centers of power. Its consumerism is 
reflected in the lucrative mobile phone business in Nigeria where almost everyone now carries a 
mobile phone whether they can maintain it or not.  In terms of the Human Development Index (HDI), 
a UNDP global study shows that 22 of the 24 countries in the ―low human development‖ category 
are African states.  Given sub-Saharan Africa‘s total external debt at $195.7 billion—21.2% of its 
GNI—and the focus of globalization on information and communications technologies and 
biotechnology, the prospects for African states‘ full participation in the global economy remain 
gloomy (UNDP 2009). External debt as a percentage of GDP is another indicator of the extent to 
which economic activities in sub-Saharan Africa remain unable to meet the challenges of domestic 
needs and external responsibilities, which are tied to the region‘s current incapacity to innovatively 
transform from the post-colonial to the service/information economy of the 21st century that 
demands attention to scientific and technological knowledge bases and production. 
For example, with regard to overall investment, government fiscal balance in the region is 
generally negative. Specifically, however, overall investment in Nigeria compared to Zambia 
remains mostly positive. A snapshot of growth patterns during a period of relative stability reveals 
that resource-rich sub-Saharan African states have better economic growth numbers compared to 
non-resource-rich states.  For the region, average real (GDP) growth for sub-Saharan Africa for 
2004-2008 was 6.5 percent and declined to 2.5% in 2009. For Nigeria, real GDP growth for 2004-
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2009 was 7.0% compared to Zambia which grew at 5.8% for the same period and increased to 6.3% 
for 2009. For non-resource rich states like Kenya and Senegal, where infrastructures are relatively 
better, but which are characterized by poor attention to knowledge production in the areas of science 
and technology, low value-added economic activities are reflected in the average real GDP growth 
for 2004-2008 at 6.2% for Kenya with 2.4% decline for 2009; while Senegal on average grew at the 
rate of 4.4% from 2004-2008 but declined to 2.2% in 2009 (ibid, see Table SA1, 72). 
For the sub-Saharan Africa region, total investment as a percentage of GDP for the period 
2004-2008 was 21.1% with slight increase to 22.8% in 2009.  Specifically, for Nigeria, average 
investment as a percentage of its GDP for 2004-2008 was 23.1% with relative increase to 28.0% for 
2009; for Zambia, it was 22.7% for the period 2004-2008 with a slight increase to 23.5% in 2009.  
For the region, the gross national savings as a percent of GDP was 21.5% for 2004-08; while for 
Nigeria it was 38.8% with increases to 42.1%; and Zambia 16.3% with increases to 20.3%. In 2009, 
the region suffered a slight decrease of less than .01%.  For Nigeria and Zambia (see Table 4), the 
increases are largely explained by the infusion of investment from China in the natural resources and 
infrastructural sectors that helped to boost the economies.  But if we examine the overall fiscal 
balance, including grants, the numbers are not encouraging. For example, for 2004-08, overall fiscal 
balance for sub-Saharan Africa was only 1.8% of GDP with a significant decline by 2009 to -5.7%.  
For Nigeria, the balance for the same period was 5.3% but by 2009 it declined to -10.3%; while 
Zambia registered an overall balance of 2.4% in 2004-08 with a value of -3.2% of GDP in 2009 
(ibid, see Tables SA6, 77; SA7, 78; SA8, 79). However, while the numbers for Nigeria do not 
change if grants are excluded, the argument about low attention to value-added production through 
science and technology education becomes more important for Zambia and the region as a whole if 
grants are absent. For 2004-08, Zambia without grants experienced an overall fiscal balance of -6.8% 
of GDP and -7.3% for 2009; for sub-Saharan Africa, the numbers are -0.1% and -7.2% respectively 
(ibid, see Table SA9, 80) . 
Similar to other indicators above, government debt in 2004-2008 for the region was 41.1% of 
GDP but with significant decline to 33.3% in 2009; and for Nigeria, it was an average of 23.5% of 
GDP in 2004-2008 declining to 15.5% in 2009.  The decline is explained by the massive debt 
forgiveness negotiated under the second Obasanjo regime (2003-2007) by the former Finance 
Minister, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala.  However, Zambia‘s average external debt as a percentage of GDP 
for 2004-2008 was 63.8% with significant decline to 27.7% in 2009 (ibid, see table SA 12, 83). The 
decline for Zambia is largely explained by international financial institutions and Chinese 
government debt forgiveness programs as well as Chinese direct investment in Zambia. And, as a 
consequence of the debt forgiveness for the region generally, external debt to official creditors also 
declined as is shown in the data for SSA during 2004-08 which stood at 18.5% of GDP declining to 
11.9% in 2009. During the same period (2004-2008), Nigeria‘s external debt declined from 12.3% of 
GDP, reaching 2.6% in 2009; while Zambia‘s declined from 39.0% in 2004-08 to 12.3% of GDP in 
2009 (ibid, see table SA24, 95). And as Table 1 indicates, Chinese foreign direct investment stock 
has been increasing in Africa—resulting in the generally observed improved economic performance 
in the region as well as in specific countries and sectors of the economies.    
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Table 1: Chinese Investment in Africa 
FDI Stock (US$, in millions) 1990 2005 
Africa 49.2 1595.3 
North Africa 3.4 618.4 
Other Africa 45.9 976.9 
Total World 1029 57200 
FDI flows (% of total Chinese FDI flows) .. 3 
FDI flows (US$, in millions) 1.5 369 
Source: UNCTAD, 2007, ―Asian Foreign Direct Investment in 
Africa: Towards a New Era of Cooperation among Developing 
Countries‖ United Nations Publications 
 
 
 
Indeed, as Table 4 below shows, most Chinese FDI in loans and grants targeted sectors of the 
economies that require some form of advanced technology that most African countries do not have.  
The expectation of advocates of technology transfer has been that with increased foreign direct 
investment across Africa, technological transfers as well as other skills sets would enhance the 
capacity of African states and citizens to develop their own resources to enhance economic and 
social wellbeing. 
However, overall, the Chinese approach, which utilizes exclusively Chinese citizens and 
resources in implementing aid programs in Africa merely, continues the existing pattern of Western 
engagement with Africa—without legacies of capacity building and measurable sustainable 
economic improvement. The low level of scientific and technological knowledge creation within 
certain parts of the world, notably, Africa, is reflected in the direction of FDI and portfolio 
investments across the globe.  Table 3 reflects the extent to which foreign economic interests, and to 
some extent, Africans themselves, lack confidence in the socio-economic environment across various 
states in the continent.  Without a strategic vision to change the perception and reality of many 
African states as either conflict ridden or ravaged by disease and hence, not suitable for investment, 
it is likely that the direction of investments toward regions assumed to be politically safe with low 
economic uncertainties will continue at the expense of regions such as sub-Saharan Africa where 
these investments are really needed. The lacuna in effective investment as a strategy of economic 
growth can be filled by emerging donors through changing their foreign aid strategies from ODA to 
investment as discussed later in the paper. 
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Table 2: Sectoral distribution of China’s FDI flows to 
Africa, 1979-2000 
Sector 
Number of 
projects 
Investment 
Value (US$, 
in millions) 
Agriculture  22 48 
Resource extraction  44 188 
Manufacturing  230 315 
Machinery  20 16 
Home appliances  36 25 
Light industry  82 87 
Textiles  58 102 
Other manufacturing  34 86 
Services  200 125 
Others  3 6 
Total 499 681 
Source: UNCTAD, 2007, ―Asian Foreign Direct 
Investment in Africa: Towards a New Era of Cooperation 
among Developing Countries‖ United Nations Publications 
 
 
 
Using global resource flows as a measure of benefits from the contemporary global economy 
within the framework of free trade, Table 3 shows that most African states are marginalized, 
neglected and under-invested. Empirically, the data on direct foreign investment (FDI), which occur 
when foreigners acquire a controlling interest (stock ownership of 10 percent or more) in a business 
enterprise in another country (Carbaugh 1995), are quite revealing compared to direct investment in 
other regions, which, although are developing countries, are strategically located with regard to the 
global marketplace.  From Table 3, total FDI in selected sub-Saharan African countries in 2008 was 
$14.3 billion compared to FDI of $9.5 billion to Egypt, $60 billion to Hong Kong and $75 billion to 
Russia in the same year! Furthermore, compared to $11 billion FDI for Singapore, $10 billion for 
Argentina, $40 billion to India and $24.3 billion for Mexico in the same period (see World Bank 
2010), total FDI that went to selected sub-Saharan African countries reveals the marginal status of 
most African countries from the interests of global investors and states. 
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Table 3 - Global Resource Flows to Selected African Countries, 2008 (Kieh and Agbese, 2012)  
Countries Net foreign 
direct 
investment 
flows  
(US$ 
millions) 
Net 
portfolio 
investment 
flows  
(US$ 
millions) 
Net official 
development 
assistance 
(US$ millions) 
(ODA 2009) 
External 
debt as 
% of 
GNI 
Debt 
service 
ratio as % 
of exports 
of goods 
and 
services 
Angola 1,678.9 -- 368.8 (0.5) 21.3 2.5 
Burkina Faso 137 -- 997.9 (12.6) 21.2 -- 
Burundi 3.8 -- 508.5 (43.9) 124.7 28.1 
Cameroon 38.2 -1.2 524.6 (2.3) 12.1 -- 
Central African Rep 121 -- 256.4 (13.0) 48.7 -- 
Ethiopia 108.5 0.00 3,327.4 (13.0) 10.9 2.8 
Ghana 2,111.5 0.00 1,293.2 (8.6) 31.3 3.2 
Ivory Coast 402.4 78.8 616.5 (2.7) 56.0 9.2 
Kenya 95.5 5 1,360.4 (4.5) 21.7 4.5 
Malawi 37 -- 912.6 (21.2) 22.7 -- 
Mali 127 -- 963.8 (11.4) 25.8 -- 
Mozambique 587 0.38 1,993.7 (22.0) 39.4 1.2 
Niger 147 -- 605.3 (11.3) 18.1 -- 
Nigeria 3,635.5 -4,684 1,289.7 (0.7) 5.7 -- 
Sudan 2,600.5 -0.05 2,383.5 (4.8) 37.5 2.5 
Tanzania 744 2.8 2,330.7 (11.7) 29.9 1.2 
Uganda 787.8 -32 1,656.7 (11.8) 15.8 1.7 
Zambia 938.6 -5.6 1,085.9 (8.4) 23.0 3.2 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators Database.  The data in parentheses represent 
the net Official Development Assistance (ODA) as a percentage of GNI for 2008. Also, while for 
2008 Foreign Direct Investment was $14.3 billion, Portfolio Investment total was $-4.6 billion. 
 
Similarly, portfolio investment, which is defined as an investment in a state by foreigners in 
which debt or stock ownership is involved, is as bad, if not worse, than FDI. Here, it is significant to 
note that while portfolio investment results in claims on resources, quite often, no participation in 
managing the company or asset is involved (Lairson and Skidmore 1997, 448).  To that extent, 
portfolio investment can be socio-politically interpreted as a measure of the confidence that 
foreigners have in a state and its economy. And, while portfolio investments are generally not the 
preferred option for most investors, the World Development Indicators 2008 database reveals the 
concentration of portfolio investments to be mostly in the high and medium human development 
categories of states. For example, while total portfolio investments for the selected sub-Saharan 
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African states given in Table 3 was $-4.6 billion, portfolio investment for the United Kingdom was 
$70 billion, the United States was $126 billion and $17 billion for Hong Kong ( see World 
Development Indicator 2010).  Clearly, for African countries to develop sustainable economic 
growth patterns that are sufficient to mitigate poverty and increase access to education, healthcare 
and other public and private services, there is need to increase foreign direct investment, not 
traditional ODA. The argument for direct investment as an external engine of economic growth is 
specific. Foreign Direct Investment 
. . . provides probably the most important and cheapest channel of direct technology transfer 
to developing countries. . . . FDI is associated with the transfer of capital, technology, and 
knowledge from the home to host countries.  The potential to generate considerable 
technological spillovers is explained by the propensity of foreign firms to conduct research 
and development as well as their relatively superior technology compared to that available in 
developing countries (see Ogbu et.al 2009, 105-152).  
 
ODA to Nigeria and Zambia 
For many years, ODA flows to Nigeria and Zambia did not have any significant measureable impact 
on economic growth and development in these countries. In fact, most of the funds reaching these 
countries as foreign development assistance, were easily swindled by unscrupulous civil servants and 
politicians. Given the extremely high levels of bureaucratic and political corruption in these countries 
and the failure of national institutions to hold the ruling elites accountable to the governed, it was 
inevitable that foreign resource inflows, in the form of foreign aid to governments, would be 
misappropriated. However, foreign financial flows in the form of FDI have had a significantly 
positive impact on economic growth in Nigeria and Zambia. FDI in commodities export for several 
African countries, and specifically, Nigeria and Zambia, have recorded measurable improvement in 
economic activities since China increased its economic interest in the region in 2000.  The general 
assumption by UNDP and World Bank economists is that the fundamentals are good for continuing 
improvement in economic performance in sub-Saharan Africa for the future.  
Recently, analysts have lauded the improvements in economic activities that have occurred in 
Africa in spite of the global financial meltdown and have attributed such improvements to the ability 
of policymakers in many African countries to provide their economies with the appropriate or 
enabling macroeconomic environment. What has been missing from this analysis is the role played 
by FDI in such economic performance. Indeed, a closer examination of the sources of improved 
economic performance in Nigeria and Zambia, for example, will show that cash infusion through 
FDI in specific sectors of the two countries‘ economies by Chinese firms and government subsidies 
for securing contracts for their companies have had a significant positive impact on recent economic 
performance in these countries.  As Tables 2 and 4 show, China‘s investments and grants have 
generally targeted infrastructural construction and services sectors in Africa, and specifically, in 
Nigeria and Zambia. Such grants include investments in FM radio transmitters, security 
communications systems, construction of grain silos, rail lines and power stations. On the surface, 
the investments in the infrastructural sectors of the Zambian and Nigerian economies are quite 
laudable.  Substantively, the sectors identified on Table 4 reveal a deeper problem of low science and 
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technology education/skills discussed previously. While investments are preferred to loans and 
outright aid without accountability and transparency, it would be even more effective if these 
investments are based on joint ventures that truly partner with African countries, citizens and 
corporations, and based on certain shared beliefs in the capacity of the investments to translate into 
economic growth and social progress.   
Indeed, as explained above, in spite of the positive economic improvement, government 
fiscal balance remains negative largely because the FDI is not connected to any indigenously driven 
policy framework that insists on ensuring that savings in one sector offset higher costs in another. In 
order words, the savings generated by Nigeria and Zambia from increased investments from China 
and loan forgiveness from the international financial institutions have not been utilized to effectively 
ensure progressive improvement in other economic and social sectors of the state. Hence, the 
continuing negative fiscal balance.  Thus, while it appears that Nigeria and Zambia and other African 
countries are reaping the rewards of increased Chinese attention in the continent through FDI, loans, 
grants and debt forgiveness, these efforts are not translating into technology and skills transfers to 
Africans. For African countries, the challenge is establishing enforceable policies to protect their 
states‘ interests against poor contract performance by Chinese firms. While Europeans have used 
unaccountable foreign aid to post-colonial dictators across the continent to maintain the legacies of 
poor infrastructure and bad governance which they bequeathed to the exploited and looted African 
countries they colonized, the Chinese, a non-former colonizer, uses a different brand of aid that is 
different in its transparency. Although Chinese government policy is not to interfere in the internal 
affairs of the African countries that it provides economic assistance, it is important to note that its aid 
policy is designed specifically to maximize Chinese national objectives and not those of the recipient 
countries. Hence, China‘s presence in Africa is not designed to enhance economic growth and 
development in Africa but to help the Chinese government, through Chinese multinational 
companies, extract critical raw materials (e.g., oil and minerals) for the country‘s home industries 
and to prepare the African countries to serve as receptacles for excess output from Chinese 
industries. In a way, then, China is not that different from the European and American capitalists 
who have, in the past, been condemned for exploiting African vulnerabilities to enrich their own 
citizens. In fact, without a change in strategy, the effect of China‘s development aid to Africa and 
potentially that of other emerging donors, will remain the same as those of the continent‘s traditional 
benefactors—the Western industrial countries. Without a fundamental change in the relationship 
between African countries and these new donors, the continent will remain, as it has since the 
colonial enterprise was first unleashed on unsuspecting Africans, as a source of raw materials for 
industrial production in faraway lands and markets for what are often technologically obsolete and 
dangerous products from those lands. The change in the relationship, of course, must come from and 
be dictated by African policymakers. After all, development in countries such South Korea, PRC and 
Taiwan, which are not major aid donors, was achieved only when these countries insisted on an aid 
scheme or strategy that not only took their specificities into account, but allowed them to determine 
the nature and scope of the projects to be pursued. In fact, it was the emphasis on partnerships and 
joint-ventures with companies located in the donor countries that enhanced development in these 
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emerging aid donors and allowed them to import necessary and relevant technologies for rapid 
economic growth. Compare that with the situation in Africa where donors literarily force African 
economies to accept obsolete and ill-fitting technologies as well as products, which quite often, 
create health problems that these countries do not have the capacity to handle.  
The concentration of global resources in regions that are considered politically safe and 
economically ―profitable‖ shows that ongoing global processes are not new.  Their intellectual 
traditions and policy prescriptions are similar to modernization arguments and neoclassical economic 
views of the existing liberal international institutions that advance the interests of industrialized 
countries. However, more troubling than the investment issue is the reliance of most African states 
on official development assistance as a significant form of national budget subvention. Table 3 
reveals that ODA as a percentage contribution to most African states‘ GNI is in the double digits. 
Also, if the high debt service ratio is computed as a percentage of exports of goods and services, it 
becomes possible to see that the resources that African states receive in the form of ODA are used to 
pay interests on outstanding loans to external institutions.  The question is: given the fact that efforts 
to use foreign aid to ―help‖ African states develop their economies and stabilize their domestic 
political institutions and processes have not resulted in economic growth and political stability since 
independence, what alternative approach is likely to become a game changer for the region‘s need for 
economic development and political stability? The next section examines the argument for policy 
transfer within the context of emerging donors‘ assistance to sub-Saharan African states. 
 
Policy Transfer and Emerging Donors Effective Engagement with Africa 
The literature on official development assistance and the extent it has succeeded or failed to advance 
development, especially in Africa, is impressive. The core issue here is why ODA has failed to 
achieve its stated policy objective of economic development (Kalu and Kim, 2009) and the extent to 
which emerging donors like China, Japan and South Korea are able to adopt newer, more robust 
approaches to foreign assistance to achieve more effective and measurable economic development 
outcomes in sub-Saharan Africa.  
According to Mark Evans, ―policy transfer is a theory of policy development that seeks to 
make sense of a process or set of processes in which knowledge about institutions, policies or 
delivery systems at one sector or level of governance is used in the development of institutions, 
policies or delivery systems at another sector or level of governance‖ (Evans 2004, 10).  In this 
sense, ideas and policies that have worked in one context and are assumed exportable to other 
societies or institutions can be copied and contextualized and implemented in another setting. 
Substantively, and as is evident in liberal democracy, policy transfer is not sui generis to Western 
societies and can therefore be exported or implemented in other regions of the world.  However, in 
the contexts of educational and economic policies that have consistently been shown to be exportable 
(with due modification and sensitivity to cultural contexts) the idea of policy transfer is more 
verifiable from Western societies such as Britain and the United States to non-western states like 
India, Japan, South Korea and China. According to Richard Rose (1991), policy transfer is quite 
normal because ―every country has problems, and each thinks that its problems are unique. . . . 
However, problems that are unique to one country . . . are abnormal . . . [because] confronted with a 
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common problem, policy makers in cities, regional governments and nations can learn from their 
counterparts elsewhere. . . ‖ (cited in Evans 2004, 12). In this sense, I argue that policy transfer that 
targets science and technology education, managerial skills and collaborative projects in various 
African states will yield productive economic activities that will resolve problems of unemployment, 
poverty, access to healthcare and other socio-economic/cultural issues that tend to empower citizens 
and investors to have confidence in various African states. Such targeted policy environments must 
exist in a condition characterized by relative policy autonomy, enforceable rule of law, ODA as 
investment as well as a merit-based process for identifying human capital necessary for reforming 
state institutions, creating employment in the civil service and private industry. 
It is not strange that after political independence, most states in Africa lacked the capacity for 
designing and implementing economic development policies in the context in which decolonization 
occurred. Unlike most former colonizers of Asian and Latin American territories, colonial powers in 
Africa did not leave a legacy of infrastructure or effective governance institutions for managing the 
economies, independent of the metropolitan economies.  Indeed, unlike the British legacy of 
effective civil service structure and education in India, many Anglophone states in Africa were left 
without adequate technical manpower and subsequently had to rely on advice from international 
institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the Ford Foundation and 
other entities that were willing to second personnel and or ―how to‖ documents for running the new 
nations.   
Policy transfers are not, by themselves, problematic. It is often the contextual structure and 
implementation that determine the extent such policy/idea borrowing becomes useful. As Mark 
Evans states, ―Public organizations in both developed and developing countries do not always 
possess the expertise to tackle the problems they confront and increasingly look outside the 
organization to other governments or non-governmental organizations for the answers to problems‖  
(Evans 2004, 3).  In the case of African countries, the absence of sufficiently trained technical 
manpower for running the civil service and the larger economies, coupled with a decolonization 
project that was severely constrained by the politics of the Cold War, produced poorly managed 
domestic economic institutions and states that came to depend very heavily on foreign resources 
from these countries‘ former colonizers—most of these resource flows came in the form of foreign 
aid. Unfortunately, these policy transfers were poorly articulated and managed and included 
economic development projects that were structured around five-year development plans—and funds 
for underwriting of these plans came from both the capitalist West and the socialist East. The most 
important constraint to the effective functioning of these funds for genuine economic, political and 
social transformation in the African countries was that, regardless of the source of the funds, the 
maximization of African values and objectives was not the purpose of the transfers. The socialist 
East transferred funds to Africa in order to bolster its ability to achieve global dominance; the 
capitalist West acted similarly, to elicit Africa‘s help in its struggle against the spread of 
communism. Hence, African economic growth and development rarely ever was considered a 
legitimate factor to be considered in aid negotiations.  
Subsequently, policy transfers included structural adjustment programs (SAPs) that were 
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implemented across Africa in the late 1970s, irrespective of their domestic relevance. The 
intensification of these policies in the 1980s and without measurable results led to the general 
conclusion that the 1980s was a lost decade for Africa.  Dolowitz and Marsh (Dolowitz and Marsh 
2000, 5-24) caution that when evaluating the relevance of policy transfers to African countries, it is 
important to consider the actors and stakeholders. Frequently, the external actors often referred to as 
political or economic consultants are not only private businesses but are sometimes recommended to 
be hired by policy-recipient countries as part of the package for aid from such institutions as the IMF 
and the World Bank.  Thus, given the failures of previous policy transfers to Africa, as exemplified 
by structural adjustment programs, going forward requires paying attention to the role of policy 
consultants, their interests and expected outcome of transferred policy. According to Dolowitz and 
Marsh, the role of policy consultants  
. . . is particularly important because they tend to offer advice based upon what they regard as 
the ―best practice‖ elsewhere, often paying little attention to the particular context in the 
borrowing political system…. For example, Policy Management Groups (PMGS) are being 
set up in numerous African countries, with little consideration of their appropriateness, 
simply because one particular consultancy firm has been pushing this model into … countries 
[such as] … Zambia and … Ghana and a number of other countries ( ibid, 10). 
In the case of African countries, policy transfers have occurred under conditions of desperation, such 
as during or immediately following civil unrest, economic crises or periods of negotiation involving 
an African state‘s  need to pay external debts or secure loans that require certificates of financial 
health from the international financial institutions. Usually, the African state in question lacks a 
neutral and technically competent epistemic constituency to offer advice on alternative options. 
Clearly, international policy transfers under such conditions have not yielded transformative change 
in the socio-economic conditions of distressed African states.  And, although, in some instances, the 
economic growth numbers may have changed in a statistically significant direction, the real story is 
that the actual impact on the citizens of such a state has often been either minuscule or actually 
negative. In many instances, some of these countries have suffered economic regression and citizens, 
especially those who historically have been marginalized and deprived (e.g., women, rural 
inhabitants, the urban poor, and minority ethnic groups), have actually seen their living standards 
deteriorate. 
Consequently, exploring policy transfers within the context of indigenously-structured 
epistemic communities with adequate representation by technically competent experts from donor 
countries is more likely to result in effective and sustainable policies with measurable impact on 
economic growth and social progress. I use the concept of epistemic communities as conceptualized 
by Peter M. Haas and defined as ―. . . a network of professionals with recognized expertise and 
competence in a particular domain and in an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within 
that domain or issue-area‖ (Hass 1992, 1-35).  As an analytical construct and process, the logic of 
epistemic community assumes that ―state actors are uncertainty reducers as well as power and wealth 
pursuers‖ (ibid, 4) who need untainted but useable technical advice of consensus-seeking experts 
unconstrained by bureaucratic tendency to protect existing budgets and roles in the government. 
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Acting as ―channels through which new ideas circulate from societies to governments as well as 
from country to country‖ (ibid, 27), epistemic communities offer an excellent alternative vision and 
opportunity for an emerging donor to envision a viable approach to effective deployment of foreign 
assistance with measurable impact and outcome.  
Indeed, the use of epistemic communities with technical expertise on development and 
financial policies was one of several components of effective management of aid in South Korea that 
transformed that country from poverty to wealth.  South Korea‘s development was anchored by 
strong leadership, efficient and talented bureaucracy as well as the Economic Planning Board, a 
technically competent group of economic policy planners with shared paradigms and belief in the 
agenda of Korean national development (Kalu and Kim 2009, 29-52). When the United States 
reduced its aid flow to South Korea during the Kennedy Administration, ―the World Bank assisted in 
the development of the International Economic Consultative Organization for Korea (IECOK). 
Through IECOK, international financial institutions and the South Korean government met regularly 
to discuss the nation‘s economic policies and effective use of foreign aid‖ ( ibid, 44), an essential 
platform that helped to continue the work of the Economic Planning Board based on the shared 
belief and commitment in South Korea‘s economic development.   
It is not the case that coordinating structures similar to IECOK have not existed in some 
African states. For example, in order to deal with a budgetary crisis and to implement a cash budget 
system in Chiluba‘s administration in Zambia in late-1992, ―the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of 
Zambia created a joint committee to oversee virtually all checks going out of the Finance Ministry‘s 
accounts. . . . [It also created] the semi-autonomous Zambia Revenue Authority in 1994‖ (Rankner, 
Walle and Mulaisho 2001, 559) to retrain tax collectors and enhance revenue collection for 
development. However, beyond these ad hoc committees in Zambia, no sustained effort has been 
made to use human capacity to deliberatively engage the intractable issues of development to think 
through different policy options to make decisions that result in stable economic growth and social 
progress.  Rather, the ad hoc nature of these committees and/or institutions in Africa makes it 
possible for leaders to cite political expediency as the reason for ignoring sound recommendations. 
This was the case under Kenneth Kaunda and later Frederick Chiluba in Zambia whose use of 
externally-derived one-size-fits-all policy transfers without attention to domestic relevance helped 
them to justify jettisoning policies that were unacceptable to their constituency.  
While an epistemic community can exist with all its expertise at the disposal of leaders in 
Africa as elsewhere, it is up to the leaders to make the right decisions. Leaders must be open to the 
influence of relevant ideas in their public policy selections.  In the case of South Korea, this approach 
worked out well, among other factors because of the firm commitment of the political leaders, 
assisted by a cadre of efficient and competent bureaucrats, and complemented by a knowledge-based 
expert group, the Economic Planning Board. The impressive economic outcome that is contemporary 
South Korea is evident and remains a possibility that emerging donors can and should entertain in 
their engagement with African countries.  The concluding section suggests ways of engaging in 
targeted use of ODA in sub-Saharan Africa. 
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Concluding Remarks 
In examining why aid succeeded or failed to improve economic performance in several African 
countries, one of the main conclusions from a World Bank study asserts that ―in Zambia, policy 
failed to improve—and actually got worse—despite a long series of adjustment loans and a mounting 
volume of aid‖(Devarajan, Dollar and Holmgren 2001,25).  Not only did the international 
community fail to influence the government of Zambia, especially the Kaunda Administration, it 
learned an important lesson that ―the conditionality mechanisms were unable to bring about policy 
change as these measures were at odds with the economic ideology . . . [of the regime] . . . and 
therefore were not supported by the political leadership.  [Also], imperfect donor coordination 
further reduced the credible threat of the conditionality instruments‖ (ibid, 572). Consequently, 
official development assistance to Zambia experienced the ―nonreform paradox‖ as more aid led to 
less accountability.  Thus, while the donor community‘s focus on reform intensified, the recipient 
government‘s focus was on obtaining more money from the donor community, and the result across 
sub-Saharan Africa is inattention to viable strategies and poor outcomes for economic growth and 
development (ibid, 582).  With regard to Nigeria, the finding is that  
Nigeria has received less foreign aid on a per capita basis than other countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa.  While average net real official development assistance (ODA) for African 
countries in 1990-1996 was US$52 per person, Nigeria received just US$2.20 per person.  As 
a percentage of gross national production (GNP), net ODA for Sub-Saharan Africa averaged 
14 percent, while for Nigeria it was less than one percent of GNP in the period.  Debt 
rescheduling, including the rescheduling of private debt (again, unusual for Africa), has been 
as important as or more important than foreign aid flows during most periods of Nigeria‘s 
economic history.  As a result, the power of the international financial institutions (IFIs) in 
relation to Nigeria comes from their unique ability to provide the ―certificate of good health‖ 
that is a necessary element of private debt rescheduling‖ (Herbst and Soludo 2001, 647). 
Furthermore, the authors conclude that with regard to Nigeria, ―what is needed is to develop new 
ideas about how Nigerian politics should operate, something that the World Bank, the IMF, and the 
bilateral donors cannot provide. Only the Nigerians can do that‖ (ibid, 675). Indeed, while Zambia is 
a classic case of an aid-dependent nation, Nigeria is a classic case of resource abundant country 
under poor management. But, in either case, where Western interests have left, Asian interests are 
being welcome by the same leaders and structures that have failed to deploy ODA for economic 
development.  Tables 5 and 6 show the involvement of Japan, South Korea and India in ODA 
activities in Nigeria and Zambia.  As Table 5 indicates, Japanese, South Korean and Indian ODA to 
Nigeria over the past several years, especially since the early 2000 when Asian ODA emerged as an 
important force in Africa, are statistically insignificant to influence the behavior of Nigerian 
government officials. This is similar to the findings by the World Bank study referenced above.  The 
core problem with economic development in Nigeria is poor governance and mismanagement of 
abundant resources.  In a nutshell, Nigeria lacks institutional and human capacities to translate its 
human and natural resources into globally competitive assets.  This is where the emerging donor 
community can invest in as discussed below.   
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Table 5: Investment and Aid to Nigeria, 2000-2009 
Japan 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Loans, Gross 
disbursement (current 
US$, in millions) 
.. .. .. .. .. 87.52 .. .. .. .. 
Grants, Disbursement 
(current US$, in millions) 
2.63 13.91 19.1 20.24 8.67 5.87 2120.6 26.84 28.96 28.88 
Total ODA, Gross 
disbursement (current 
US$, in millions) 
2.63 13.91 19.1 20.24 8.67 93.39 2120.6 26.84 28.96 28.88 
Grants (% of Total ODA) 100 100 100 100 100 6.29 100 100 100 100 
FDI Inflows (US$, in 
millions) 
0.41 0.02 0.13 .. 3.33 3.33 5.67 .. .. .. 
South Korea                     
Loans, Gross 
disbursement (current 
US$, in millions) 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Grants, Disbursement 
(current US$, in millions) 
0.03 0.14 0.23 0.09 0.11 0.21 1.72 0.91 1.93 2.14 
Total ODA, Gross 
disbursement (current 
US$, in millions) 
0.03 0.14 0.23 0.09 0.11 0.21 1.72 0.91 1.93 2.14 
Grants (% of Total ODA) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
FDI Inflows (US$, in 
millions) 
0.85 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
India                      
FDI Inflows (US$, in 
millions) 
0.79 1.05 4.09 1.36 6.14 21.3 12.61 .. .. .. 
Source (Japan, S. Korea): OECD.StatsExtracts 
Source (India): Reserve Bank of India 
Source (FDI Inflows): Nigeria Investment Promotion Commission 
  
 
Table 6 shows Zambia as a classic case of an aid-dependent country—either on the ODA 
from the industrial West as explained previously or on Asia. Zambian authorities have come to rely 
on external resources for basic services to its citizens.  And, as Table 4 shows, increased Chinese 
direct investment in Zambia is complemented by sustained ODA activities by Japan, South Korea 
and, more recently, India has joined the ODA train with lines of credit to the Zambian Government 
for the Itezhi-Tezhi hydro power project in 2010. It is important to notice that in spite of the 
sustained flow of both Western and Asian ODA to Zambia, especially since the 1980s, Zambia 
remains one of the poorest countries in the World.  It is ranked 150 out of 169 countries in the 
Human Development Index (HDI) for 2010.   While there are noticeable improvements since the 
1980s, the report notes that overall, quality of life indicators such as health, knowledge and income 
deteriorated throughout the 1990s, but finds that ―since 2000 all the components have improved; 
HDI increased by 14.5%.  If such pace is maintained, Zambia will attain its vision of being a 
prosperous middle income country by 2030‖ (UNDP, Zambia Fact Sheet). What the report does not 
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emphasize is that a significant reason for the observed improvement in Zambia is attributable to 
economies of scale due to Chinese direct investment in Zambia as Table 4 above indicates. 
 
Table 6: Investment and Aid to Zambia, 2000-2010 
Japan 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Loans, Gross disbursement 
(current US$, in millions) 
.. .. 24.38 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. - 
Grants, Disbursement 
(current US$, in millions) 
38.11 54.93 46.98 36 21.79 748.09 31.53 94.61 37.14 36.64 - 
Total ODA, Gross 
disbursement (current US$, 
in millions) 
38.11 54.93 71.36 36 21.79 748.09 31.53 94.61 37.14 36.64 - 
Grants (% of Total ODA) 100 100 65.84 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 - 
South Korea                       
Loans, Gross disbursement 
(current US$, in millions) 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. - 
Grants, Disbursement 
(current US$, in millions) 
0.02 0.05 0.09 0.12 0.02 0.11 0.21 1.05 0.68 0.92 - 
Total ODA, Gross 
disbursement (current US$, 
in millions) 
0.02 0.05 0.09 0.12 0.02 0.11 0.21 1.05 0.68 0.92 - 
Grants (% of Total ODA) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 - 
India                        
Lines of credit to Gov't of 
Zambia (US$, in millions) 
.. .. .. .. 10 .. .. .. 10 .. 50 
Purpose .. .. .. .. 
General 
purpose 
.. .. .. 
General 
purpose 
.. 
Itezhi-Tezhi 
hydro power 
project 
Source (Japan, S. Korea): OECD.StatsExtracts 
Source (India): Reserve Bank of India 
 
 
 
Similarly, Nigeria has not fared well. But, unlike Zambia, Nigeria‘s situation is not because of ODA; 
overall ODA to Nigeria is statistically insignificant as a complement to oil revenue.  For Nigeria, 
ODA is simply a partial tool of engagement between the Nigerian authorities whose main interest 
remains a financial clean bill of health for purposes of accessing private sector loans. Thus, given the 
wealth that has been generated through oil revenue and crises-induced windfalls in petrol dollars as a 
result of series of conflicts in the Middle East since the 1970s, life expectancy of below 50 years and 
a general HDI of 142 out of 169 ( UNDP, Nigeria- Country Profile of Human Development 
Indicator) for Nigeria are uninspiring.  What these two countries and many sub-Saharan Africa 
countries have in common is the lack of indigenously derived commitment to put economic 
development on the policy agenda. In both countries, the donor community has been unable to focus 
on the substantive issue of economic development in disbursing ODA. A key part of the problem has 
been the nature of policy transfers in the form of ODA that have paid little or no attention to local 
involvement or domestic ownership of the policy to be implemented.  The consequence has been 
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(unintended?) presence of active external ―development experts‖ in their SUVs administering 
guidelines on reform policies to massively passive recipients of policy transfers and local 
consumption of the outputs.  However, while the majority of the citizens are passive because of their 
non-involvement, government officials actively participate in the process of securing and disbursing 
external aid. The combination described above provides excellent opportunities for non-performance 
of policy reforms that are likely to increase opportunistic behaviors by civil servants, politicians and 
other administrators. Without condoning corruption, it is irrational to expect bureaucrats and other 
public servants to be motivated by public interest only while assuming entrepreneurs and the rest of 
the citizens to be motivated by private interests, especially under clear conditions of scarcity. Under 
such considerations, it is necessary to begin to (re-)activate epistemic communities across Africa. 
Such communities should be commissioned with the clear intention of mobilizing an excellent 
alternative vision as they provide necessary leadership on how to use human capacity to 
deliberatively engage the intractable issues of development, guiding citizens and leaders to think 
through different policy options to make decisions that will result in stable economic growth and 
social progress on the continent.  
 
Suggestions 
Clearly, it is self or national interests that motivate both Western and non-Western donors‘ activities 
in Africa and elsewhere. And, irrespective of the noted difference in its form of engagement with 
Africa, China‘s patterns of interactions are similar in approach and general outcome with those of the 
West. Given this conference‘s theme of Styles of ODA and the extent to which the Asian nations‘ 
ODA differ from Western ODA, there are specific ways to change the style and substance of ODA. 
Especially, the emerging donor communities‘ efforts should continue to aim for the desired objective 
of achieving economic development outcome of recipient states while securing economic and 
national interests of the donor community. If the patterns of interactions are changed to require that 
ODA be considered on the basis of targeted projects whose frameworks are linked to national policy 
for economic development that specifies strategies for whom, what, when and how the project is to 
be completed as precondition for aid, the outcomes are likely to be measurable improvements in 
economic growth and social progress in the target countries.  Given that anyone can spend money or 
resources, but not necessarily in a wise way, ODA should be based on a clearly articulated proposal 
of what and how the aid will be used. The expected impact and outcome of each project should be 
clearly articulated and understood by both donor and recipient states.  In that light, and given that aid 
donors and recipients are self-interested actors with expectations of advancing their own objectives, a 
neutral entity is both necessary and sufficient for making Asian ODA measurably different from the 
Western in at least three ways. 
 Although there is a need to change the general perception of official development assistance, 
what needs immediate and special attention is changing the notion of foreign aid.  Based on existing 
experience and as demonstrated by the notion of ―nonreform paradox,‖ most of the recipients of 
foreign aid tend to treat it as free lunch or free money and consequently have not idealized the 
process of translating ODA into local/domestic economic development projects.  In contrast to the 
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idea of aid as free money, South Koreans as aid recipients did not just hand out U.S. food aid to the 
hungry; rather, people had to work in order to receive the food.  And, as painful as it may have been 
at the time, the consequence was that the government and the people invested in themselves and the 
outcome is a transformed society from abject poverty to reasonable wealth. Thus, theoretically, ODA 
should be changed to ODI—official development investment.  When aid is treated as investment by 
the donor and recipient, both the investors and the target state will, as a matter of course, engage in 
feasibility studies to determine why resources should be invested in a particular segment of the 
economy or society and the mechanisms for accountability. 
 Secondly, one of the major constraints to economic development and social progress in sub-
Saharan Africa is the poor state of science and technology education. From USAID to United 
Nations reports, only 9% of students in the region enroll in science classes, which explain the ratio of 
only 48 researchers for every one million people in sub-Saharan Africa. Official development 
investment in science and technology education that links science education in an African country 
with science education experts, departments and programs in the donor‘s country will benefit both 
donors and the recipients because such collaboration will build trust through joint research, 
publications, and mutual respect that comes from exchange of expert knowledge, especially if such 
exchanges result in setting the agenda for joint research programs.  Such a shift in the style of ODA 
efforts will solve the problem of lack of ownership in the existing ODA programs that have resulted 
in non-policy performance.   
In Nigeria, for example, joint research could become the basis for the award of construction 
contracts that could finally reactivate and enable the completion of old and unsuccessful projects like 
the Ajaokuta Steel Mill that has been under construction and different managements for the last 30 
years without a pound of steel to show for the wasted billions.  Such joint research could also 
become the basis for teaching science, mathematics, and technology from primary—to tertiary-
school levels that will help strengthen the human and institutional capacities needed to engineer 
economic development in target states.  At the same time, such joint efforts will create and enhance 
markets for the talents and products in the donor country.  Rather than aid, investment is the 
transformational strategy for ensuring that ODA from Asia to Africa will be significantly different 
from ODA from the West to Africa. 
 Lastly, in addition to changing perceptions of ODA as free lunch to one of investment, 
serious consideration should be given to using indigenously derived projects in the development of 
collaboration strategies with donor countries. In addition to exploring indigenous knowledge bases in 
science and technology, other areas of need such as climate change, environmental sustainability and 
economic development in Africa would also benefit from such considerations.  In many ways, 
emphasis on climate change and economic sustainability is about ensuring the availability of 
sufficient food to feed people.  For many African countries, the existing pattern of ODA from the 
West has substantially undermined the capacity of Africans to grow food in the continent. Food-
related development aid is one in which Western nations have consistently subsidized their own 
farmers, which depresses the price of agricultural products from Africa with the direct consequence 
that many African farmers have been rendered incapable of farming profitably because of the 
availability of cheap imported food from subsidized Western farmers, as well as, the unavailability of 
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appropriate and affordable agricultural technologies.  One of the ways the Asian ODA can be 
different is by targeted regional engagement with African farmers—through appropriate 
consultations with these farmers, projects can be designed that help increase yield per acre, ensure 
that these farmers produce enough food to feed their populations and hopefully save some for export 
to earn the foreign exchange that these countries need to purchase technology for national 
development. The issue is whether emerging Asian donors will dare to be different in developing 
their styles of ODA from that of the Western donors, which has largely undermined genuine 
development efforts by the use of ODA as foreign policy tools without regard on its impact on 
African countries. Changing the style to development investment based on emerging donors‘ use of 
their human capital and material resources in Africa will directly engage domestic political actors, 
institutions and norms and result in jointly identified projects that will contribute to mutual strategic 
and economic development and social progress for donor and recipient states. 
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